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1 CACHE , L.L.C, a Utah Limited 
Liability Company, and GARY R. 
BRACKEN, an individual, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
: APPELLEE'S BRIEF 
: Court of Appeal Case #2005 0181 CA 
: District Court 
: Case No. 040101608 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-2a-3(j). This Appeal is from a final Order granting Defendant/Appellees' 
Motion for Summary Judgment as well as Defendants' Motion for Dismissal, which was 
treated like a Motion for Summary Judgment. Utah Code § 78-2-2. 
Plaintiffs original Complaint was filed in the First Judicial District Court, County of 
Cache alleging breach of contract by 1 Cache, L.L.C, which had filed bankruptcy and 
received a discharge and Plaintiff sought personal liability against Gary R. Bracken and 
Aaron Bracken when they signed the credit application for 1 Cache, L.L.C. in their 
representative capacity. Plaintiff DBL Distributing, Inc. even contested the bankruptcy filing 
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of 1 Cache, L.L.C. and the Bankruptcy Court granted a full discharge for 1 Cache, L.L.C. 
Defendants argued that they were not personally liable under the credit application because 
it was not a personal guarantee and even if it could be construed as such, they never signed 
in their individual capacity, but only as corporate officers for 1 Cache, L.L.C. 
STATEMENTS OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Defendant and Appellees specifically argue that Plaintiff/Appellant has misstated the 
proper issues before this Court. The main issues before this Court are as follows: 
POINT I 
WHETHER THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD AFFIRM 
THE DISTRICT COURT ORDER OF JANUARY 25,2005 GRANTING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHERE 
THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF MATERIAL FACT AS TO 
WHETHER THE CREDIT APPLICATION IN JANUARY OF 1999 IS 
SOLELY A CREDIT APPLICATION FOR 1 CACHE, L.L.C. AND 
NOWHERE MENTIONS THAT IT IS A PERSONAL GUARANTEE OF 
ANY SORT. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review is for correctness of the Trial Court's interpretation of the 
contract. See Green River Canal Co. v. Thavne. 84 P.3d 1134, 1140 (Utah 2003), Central 
Florida Inv. Inc. v. Parkwest Ass, and Beaver Creek Ass.. 40 P.3d 599 (Utah 2002). 
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POINT II 
WHETHER THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD AFFIRM 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER OF JANUARY 25, 2005 WHICH 
FOUND BY IMPLICATION THE SUBSEQUENT CREDIT 
APPLICATIONS REPLACED THE JANUARY 29, 1999 
APPLICATION BY MERGER INTO THE MARCH 22, 2001 CREDIT 
APPLICATION; THE APRIL 24, 2001 CREDIT APPLICATION AND 
THE BLANK CREDIT APPLICATION IN JULY 2001. EVEN IF 
THERE IS OR IS NOT MERGER, THE CREDIT APPLICATIONS 
SHOW NO PERSONAL LIABILITY TO A CORPORATE OFFICER. 
STATEMENT OF REVIEW 
Whether merger or integration occurs is determined by whether the parties intended 
the contracts to replace the old one and the contracts are nearly identical and between the 
original parties. See Foote v. Taylor, 635 P.2d 46 (Utah 1981), Ringwood v. Foreign Auto 
Works. Inc.. 671 P.2d 182 (Utah 1983). 
POINT III 
WHETHER THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD AFFIRM 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER OF JANUARY 25, 2005 WHICH 
DENIED PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
GRANTED DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DISMISSAL WHEN THE 
FACTS CLEARLY SHOW THAT THE ONLY INSTRUMENT SIGNED 
WAS A CREDIT APPLICATION FOR 1 CACHE, L.L.C., 
SPECIFICALLY STYLED A CREDIT APPLICATION AND SIGNED 
BY EITHER 1 CACHE, L.L.C. OR 1 CACHE, L.L.C.'S CORPORATE 
OFFICERS ONLY IN THEIR REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY AS 
OFFICERS AND NOT AS INDIVIDUALS. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Trial Court's interpretation of a contract presents a question of law, which the 
Appellate Court reviews for correctness. Green River Canal Co.. vs. Thayne. 84 P.3d, 1134, 
1140 (Utah 2003). The question of whether a contract is ambiguous is decided by the Court 
under Utah Code Annotated § 70A-3-402(2) as well as case law on that very subject in 
Mountain America Credit Union v. McClellan. 854 P.2d 590 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). The 
Court is also obligated to construe the contract against the drafter of the contract, which in 
this case is DBL Distributing, Inc. Jones. Waldo, Holbrook v. Dawson. 923 P.2d 1366,1372 
(Utah 1996). The Trial Court found no ambiguity in the signatures since they were clearly 
in a representative capacity. 
POINT IV 
WHETHER DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO ALL OF THEIR 
COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES NECESSITATED TO DEFEND 
AGAINST THIS ACTION WHERE THE CONTRACT SPECIFIC ALLY 
ALLOWS FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND THE RECIPROCAL 
PROVISIONS OF UTAH LAW WOULD APPLY IN THIS CASE. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Attorney fees should be granted to the prevailing party under the reciprocal provisions 
of U.C.A. § 78-27-56.5 when a contract allows attorney fees to one party. 
4 
DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The full texts of the following determinative statutes are reproduced at Appendix A. 
A. Utah Code Annotated §78-27-56, for bad faith. 
B. Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-56.6, attorney fee reciprocal provision. 
C. Utah Code Annotated § 70A-3-402(2), representative of company is not liable. 
D. Utah Code Annotated § 16-1 Oa-622, shareholders not liable. 
E. Utah Code Annotated § 16-10a-841, officers not liable. 
F. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 11, for bad faith. 
G. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12, motion to dismiss treated as summary 
judgment. 
H. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56, summary judgment. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is a commercial collection case, governed by Article III of the Uniform 
Commercial Code as well as Article II of the Uniform Commercial Code (District Court File 
pages 2-49). DBL Distributing, Inc. sold electronic goods to 1 Cache, L.L.C. on an open 
account, all before March 2001 (District Court File pages 2-49). The credit application was 
in the name of 1 Cache, L.L.C. only and Gary and Aaron Bracken did not sign any personal 
guarantees or make any personal guarantees that they would pay the open account if 1 Cache, 
L.L.C. defaulted (District Court File pages 6, 53-54, 75-89). In fact, they made it clear that 
they were signing only in their representative capacity for 1 Cache, L.L.C. who was the only 
consumer (District Court File pages 199-201). 1 Cache, L.L.C. was unable to pay for the 
goods delivered and filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy and received a full discharge of the debt 
(District Court File pages 58-60). Plaintiff contested the bankruptcy and filed an adversary 
proceeding trying to pierce the corporate veil, but was not allowed to do so (District Court 
File pages 52-54). Plaintiff then filed this action in the First District Court, County of Cache, 
seeking to hold Gary Bracken and Aaron Bracken personally liable for the discharged debts 
of 1 Cache, L.L.C. 
B. Course of the Proceeding 
On August 4, 2004, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant Gary Bracken and 
1 Cache, L.L.C. alleging that Defendant Gary Bracken was personally liable for the balance 
of $126,345.07 in unpaid outstanding invoices that were incurred by 1 Cache, L.L.C. prior 
to March 2001 (District Court File pages 2-49). Plaintiff attached a credit application dated 
March 22, 2001 (see Exhibit 2 attached in addendum)as evidence that Defendants signed 
a personal guarantee, along with a list of invoices made solely to 1 Cache, L.L.C. (District 
Court File pages 2-49). 
On August 26, 2004, Defendant Gary Bracken and 1 Cache, L.L.C. filed a Motion to 
Dismiss and a Request for Sanctions and a Verified Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
in Support of the Motion to Dismiss (District Court File pages 50-52). In the Motion to 
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Dismiss, Defendant Gary Bracken asserted 1 Cache, L.L.C. was a Utah corporation which 
totally protected Gary Bracken from personal liability through the corporate shield. Gary 
Bracken further argued that it was clear that the DBL Distributing, Inc. credit applications 
were only credit application agreements and not personal guarantees and that if Gary Bracken 
signed anything it was only in his representative capacity as the President of 1 Cache, L.L.C. 
He did not personally guarantee any debt (District Court File pages 50-52). 
On August 30, 2004 Plaintiff filed Plaintiffs Opposition to Motion to Dismiss. 
Plaintiffs also filed a Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint (District Court File 
pages 64-77). Plaintiff tried to attach other credit applications for 1 Cache, L.L.C. as 
Exhibits "A" (only page 2 of January 29, 1999 document), "B" (document dated April 24, 
2001), and "C" (blank document dated July 18,2001), but failed to attach the original Exhibit 
"A" dated March 22, 2001 attached to the Complaint (District Court File pages 74-77). 
Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint sought to drop 1 Cache, L.L.C. as 
a party, and add Aaron Bracken as a party and was otherwise the same as the Complaint filed 
on August 4, 2004 except as noted above. 
On September 8, 2004, Defendant Gary Bracken filed the Affidavit of Gary R. 
Bracken and Defendant's Verified Reply Objecting to Motion to Amend the Complaint, and 
Request for a Hearing (District Court File pages 82-102). 
On September 16, 2004, Plaintiff filed Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Summary Judgment, and 
7 
Plaintiffs Affidavit in Support of Summary Judgment (District Court File pages 103-168). 
On September 30, 2004, Defendant Gary Bracken filed his Response to Plaintiffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment by indicating that the issues were similar to those in the 
Motion to Dismiss, his Verified Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Affidavit of 
Gary Bracken, and Defendant's Response to Motion for Summary Judgment (District Court 
File pages 169-191). 
On October 4,2005, Plaintiff filed Notice to Submit Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint for Decision (District 
Court File pages 192-195). On October 14, 2005, the Court set the matter for hearing on 
December 13, 2004 (District Court File pages 196-197). 
The Court heard the oral argument from the parties on December 13, 2004 and took 
the matter under advisement (District Court File page 198). At this hearing Defendant 
argued to the Court what a typical personal guarantee looks like and argued that the credit 
applications were merely that and nothing more (see Exhibit 5, sample personal guarantee 
as part of the Addendum hereto). 
On January 7, 2005, the Court filed its decision entitled Memorandum of Decision 
(District Court File pages 199-202). On January 25,2005, the Court entered an Order which 
denied Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, and granted Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss the case against 1 Cache, L.L.C., Gary R. Bracken, and Aaron Bracken (District 
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Court File pages 203-205). Note the Court treated the case as against all three (3) 
Defendants and used Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint to settle all the issues. The Court 
subsequently wrote a decision hinting the matter was moot on June 29, 2005 (District Court 
File pages 240-241). Notice of Entry was filed January 27, 2005 (District Court File pages 
206-207). 
On February 17,2005, Plaintiff/Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal appealing the final 
Order entered on January 25, 2005 (District Court File pages 208-211). 
C. Summary of the Relevant Facts. 
1 Cache, L.L.C. filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy on August 26, 2002, Case Number 
0234234GEC in the Federal District Court, State of Utah, and received a complete discharge 
from all debts, including the debt of DBL Distributing, Inc. in the principal sum of 
$126,345.07 (District Court File pages 58-60). DBL Distributing, Inc. knew that 1 Cache, 
L.L.C. had filed a bankruptcy and intentionally and wilfully ignored the bankruptcy discharge 
provisions and filed suit against 1 Cache, L.L.C. and Gary Bracken as an individual on 
August 4, 2004 (District Court File pages 52-60). 
1 Cache, L.L.C. was a valid Utah corporation during all relevant times between 1999 
through September 29, 2002 in good standing and Gary R. Bracken was listed as the 
President and a shareholder of 1 Cache, L.L.C. (District Court File page 57). 
On or about January 29, 1999,1 Cache, L.L.C. signed a credit application agreement 
so that they could purchase from DBL Distributing, Inc. on credit (District Court File pages 
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85-86). See Exhibit #7 attached as part of the Addendum hereto . This Exhibit is entitled 
"Customer Information Credit Application Agreement" and 1 Cache, L.L.C. is listed as the 
customer. The corporate officers are listed as Richard Bracken, Gary Bracken, and Aaron 
Bracken. Various references were listed and Zions Bank was listed as the company bank. 
The Agreement states in relevant part: 
"We herein make application to DBL Distributing, Inc. for credit. . . . " 
"The undersigned agrees to unconditionally guarantee payment of all sums 
owed pursuant to this Agreement and further agrees to terms regarding venue. 
This intended to be and is a continuing guarantee and shall not be revoked 
except by written notice to creditor. 
By: Gary Bracken 
Owner/Corporate Officer/Partner/Principal" (District Court File pages 85-86) 
The Trial Court specifically found the language on this exhibit as follows: 
"The curious thing about the language is that there is no distinction in the 
language between customer information, credit application and personal 
guarantee." (District Court File page 201) 
The Court also found: 
"The Plaintiff would have the Court hold that the guarantee in the 1999 
application as well as the 2001 documents expose the signer thereof to 
guarantee the payment of any credit extended as result of the agreement. But 
as to the 1999 document there is no question that the customer there was 1 
Cache, L.L.C. and it was not the Defendant Gary Bracken or any other 
individual. There is little question from reading the document that the 
signature thereon was on behalf of 1 Cache, L.L.C. and there is no personal 
guarantee, only guaranteed by the customer." (District Court File page 200) 
Mr. Constantino agreed with the judge in oral argument admitting Gary Bracken was only 
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signing as an agent of 1 Cache, L.L.C, (Hearing Transcript page 6 line 12 to 19) and the 
agreement was only with 1 Cache, L.L.C. (Hearing Transcript page 11 line 17 to 22). The 
Court found no need for parol evidence since the signatures and documents were clear: 
"The language within the four corners of the contract, [excluding parole 
evidence as there is not an ambiguity created and if there was, it was created 
by the Plaintiff] should be construed against Plaintiff." (District Court File 
page 201) 
Most, if not all, of the purchase orders made by 1 Cache, L.L.C. were made prior to 
March 2001 since at that time they owed over $ 180,000.00 to DBL Distributing, Inc. and had 
paid that down to approximately $126,000.00 by September 2001 (District Court File pages 
2-49). All the orders therefor were made pursuant to Exhibit " 1 " . 
Thereafter, Plaintiff asked Defendant to sign another credit application since it was 
updating its creditor files. Defendant 1 Cache, L.L.C. signed the application (District Court 
File page 87). See Exhibit "2" attached as part of the Addendum hereto . The March 22, 
2001 application clearly is a credit application agreement between 1 Cache, L.L.C. and the 
Plaintiff, and the firm name at the bottom is 1 Cache, L.L.C, by 1 Cache, L.L.C. Gary 
Bracken's name shows up as an officer of the corporation, but nowhere on Exhibit "2" is 
their and individual signature (District Court File page 87). The Court found this to be a 
credit application solely by 1 Cache, L.L.C. (District Court File page 201) 
Plaintiff then sent another credit application agreement to 1 Cache, L.L.C. attached 
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hereto as Exhibit "3" in the Addendum and dated April 24, 2001 (District Court File page 
88). The language indicates this is a credit application agreement update. The customer 
name is 1 Cache, L.L.C. The officers listed are again Gary Bracken, Aaron Bracken and 
Richard Bracken. The language in Exhibit "3" nowhere indicates that a personal guarantee 
is being signed, but only a credit application agreement. In a small box at the bottom of the 
document in very tiny letters it states: 
"The undersigned agrees to personally guarantee payment of all sums owed 
pursuant to this agreement and further agrees to the terms regarding venue. 
This is intended to be and is a continuing guarantee and shall not be revoked 
except by written notice to creditor." 
Under this language is typed the firm name, listed as 1 Cache, L.L.C, signed by Gary 
Bracken whose title is President, only in his representative capacity. Nowhere on the 
document is there a signature line for an individual personally guaranteeing anything (District 
Court File page 88). 
On July 18,2001, Aaron Bracken signed an identical credit application to Exhibit "3" 
but this application was left blank (District Court File page 89). See Exhibit "4" attached 
to the Addendum hereto. Aaron Bracken listed the firm name as 1 Cache, L.L.C. by Aaron 
Bracken, title - Vice President. Again there is no line for an individual to sign personally 
guaranteeing anything (District Court File page 89). 
The Trial Court specifically found regarding Exhibits "3" and "4", which are the 2001 
credit applications: 
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"the personally guarantee, at least in the 2001 document, does not reflect the 
personal guarantee of someone else's obligation. It appears to be a personal 
obligation by 1 Cache, L.L.C. of the credit extended to it which is a result of 
the agreement. There is no signature line for the parties except at the bottom 
of the page and not inside the 'guarantee box.5 The focus language is part of 
the language found within a box referencing the parties to the agreement, 
evidence by the beginning language. . . 'we herein make application to DBL 
Distributing, Inc . . . . There is not separate language from that above quoted 
referencing other parties such as third party guarantees.'1 (District Court File 
page 200) 
The Court also found: 
"That the 3-22-2001 agreement was unsigned by an individual and the 4-24-
2001 agreement was signed by Defendant Gary Bracken, but as President in 
a representative capacity... .the documents were created by the Plaintiff, the 
language thereof is the Plaintiffs language, the customer is 1 Cache, L.L.C, 
there is no provision for liability on behalf of anyone else, and the signatories 
were in their representative capacities on behalf of 1 Cache, L.L.C, which 
guarantees payment." (District Court File pages 200-201) 
The Court concluded that: 
"The Plaintiff cites no law in its favor relative to the construction of these two 
documents, but the Court notes the law cited by Defendant that generally 
accepted construction principals would consider the documents were created 
by the Plaintiff, the language thereof is the Plaintiffs language, the customer 
is 1 Cache, L.L.C, there is no provision for liability on behalf of anyone else, 
and the signatories were in their representative capacities on behalf of 1 Cache, 
L.L.C. which guaranteed payment." (District Court File page 201) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
First of all, a review of the four corners of the credit applications appear to reveal that 
they are just that, credit applications between DBL Distributing, Inc. and 1 Cache, L.L.C 
There is no indication anywhere on the credit application that this is a personal guarantee. 
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For instance, a traditional personal guarantee that is customarily entered into by 1 Cache, 
L.L.C. is one such as shown on Exhibit "5" attached to the Addendum hereto showing in 
bold letters that this is a personal guarantee and that each of the signatory lines are 
underscored by personal guarantor language making it clear that the signor is signing a 
personal guarantee for company obligations. The Trial Court correctly found that the 
language on the DBL credit applications does not rise to the level of a personal guarantee and 
the signors thereto were acting as corporate officers and were only seeking credit. 
Secondly, the first credit application in January of 1999 unequivocally is not a 
personal guarantee. It is clear it was signed by Gary Bracken as an officer of 1 Cache, L.L.C. 
and that the credit was extended to 1 Cache, L.L.C. only. All of the consumer goods 
purchased for which DBL Distributing, Inc. is suing, were purchased under this credit 
application. The Trial Court correctly held that this was not a personal guarantee and even 
if it could be construed as such, it was signed on behalf of the agent of 1 Cache, L.L.C. in 
his capacity as a corporate officer. Therefore, there was no personal liability. 
Without doubt, the March 22, 2001 document is not a personal guarantee and was 
signed only by 1 Cache, L.L.C. 
The April 24, 2001 credit application is only a credit application agreement. The 
Court correctly ruled that this was signed by Gary Bracken as President only in his 
representative capacity and he is not personally liable. The July 18,2001 credit application 
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likewise is signed by Aaron Bracken as Vice President of 1 Cache, L.L.C. This application 
is blank. He has no personal liability. 
Appellees are entitled to their attorney fees to argue and defend this frivolous case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE CREDIT APPLICATIONS WERE ONLY CREDIT 
APPLICATIONS FOR THE COMPANY 1 CACHE, L.L.C. AND WERE 
NOT PERSONAL GUARANTEES AT ALL. 
The rules of construing a contract are generally as follows. The general rule of 
contract interpretation is that: 
"in choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement or a 
term thereof, that meaning is generally preferred which operates against the 
party who supplies the words or from whom a writing otherwise proceeds." 
Jones, Waldo. Holbrook v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366, 1372 (Utah 1996) citing Restatement 
Second of Contract § 206 (1981) see also 3 Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contract § 559 
(1960). In Central Florida Inv., Inc. v. Parkwest Ass, and Beaver Creek Ass.. 40 P.3d 599 
(Utah 2002) the Court found: 
"In interpreting a contract, the intentions of the parties are controlling. Dixon 
v. Pro Image, Inc., 1999 UT 89, PI 3, 987 P.2d 48 (quotation omitted). "We 
first look to the four corners of the agreement to determine the intentions of the 
parties." Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 
(Utah 1989); see also Reedv. Davis Co. Sch.Dist., 892P.2dl063,1064-1065 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995). If the language within the four corners of the contract 
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is unambiguous, the parties intentions are determined from the plain meaning 
of the contractual language, and the contract may be interpreted as a matter of 
law. Dixon, 1999 UT89 atP14, 987P.2d48 (citing WillardPease Oil & Gas 
Co. V. Pioneer Oil & Gas Co., 899 P.2d 766, 770 (Utah 1995)) . If the 
language within the four corners of the contract is ambiguous, however, 
extrinsic evidence must be looked to in order to determine the intentions of the 
parties. Id. In evaluating whether the plain language is ambiguous, we 
attempt to harmonize all of the contract's provisions and all of its terms. Id.; 
see also Buehner Block Co. V. UWCAssocs., 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988). 
"An ambiguity exists where the language 'is reasonably capable of being 
understood in more than one sense.'" Dixon, 1999 UT89 atP14, 987P.2d 48 
(quoting R & R Energies v. Mother Earth Indus., Inc., 936 P.2d 1068, 1074 
(Utah 1997) (further quotation omitted)). Accordingly we first look to the 
plain language within the four corners of the agreement to determine the 
intentions of the parties, and we attempt to harmonize the provisions in the 
pre-printed and addendum portions of the agreement." 
However, under 70A-3-402(2)(b) parol evidence is allowed between the same parties 
to show intent on the signature line when ambiguity exists about representative capacity. 
This statute was interpreted by Mountain America Credit Union v. McClellan 854 P.2d 590 
(Utah Court of Appeals 1993), cert, denied. 862 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1993). In that case the 
court specifically said that the original parties may admit extrinsic evidence when the 
litigation is between the immediate parties to the contract to determine the intent behind 
signing the document in their representative capacity if the signature line is ambiguous. 
Using the rules of construction as cited above, the trial court reviewed the January 
1999 credit application and found from the four corners of the entire agreement that it was 
purely a corporate credit application with 1 Cache, L.L.C. and did not constitute a personal 
guarantee at all. In fact, there is no language on the entire application that would suggest that 
16 
this is a personal guarantee. The only language that even talks about a guarantee is on the 
second page under the "Agreement5' section in very small type which states: 
"The undersigned agrees to unconditionally guarantee payment of all sums 
owed pursuant to this agreement and further agrees to its terms regarding 
venue. This is intended to be and is a continuing guarantee and shall not be 
revoked except by written notice to creditor." 
Immediately underneath that language however, is a signature line that says: 
By (See Exhibit 1) 
Owner/Corporate Officer/Partner/Principal 
This language unambiguously shows this was intended to be signed by a corporate 
officer for 1 Cache, L.L.C., not an individual. Plaintiff admits there is no ambiguity. 
Plaintiff drafted this and it should be construed against the Plaintiff. The trial court correctly 
found no personal guarantee language in this document making an individual personally 
liable. Basically, the document was a credit application requiring the corporation to 
unconditionally guarantee payment of the sums owed pursuant to credit extended. 
If DBL Distributing, Inc. intended to hold individuals such as Gary Bracken 
personally liable under this document they certainly should have styled in bold letters that 
this is a "personal guarantee" and that the individual signing the document would need to 
sign individually and not for the corporation and would have used a personal guarantee form 
similar to that shown in Exhibit 5. The Exhibit 1 agreement dated in January of 1999 listed 
the customer as 1 Cache, L.L.C., identified corporate officers as Gary Bracken and Aaron 
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Bracken and makes no mention of personal liability of the corporate officers for the debt or 
that they were personally guaranteeing the debt anywhere on the instrument. It was signed 
by Gary Bracken as a corporate officer on the corporate officer signature line. The trial court 
correctly used § 70A-3-402(2) showing that this was a signature by a represented person and 
therefore only the represented person, i.e., 1 Cache, L.L.C. is liable on the instrument. 
Section 70A-3-402(2) states: 
If a representative signs the name of the representative to an instrument and 
the signature is an authorized signature of the represented person, the 
following rules apply: (a) if the form of the signature shows unambiguously 
that the signature is made on behalf of the represented person who is identified 
in the instrument, the representative is not liable on the instrument." 
1 Cache, L.L.C. was listed in the instrument and Gary Bracken signed only as an officer. 
Only when the representative signs in an individual capacity without stating his title, 
position, office, or authority to represent the company and the company is not listed as the 
consumer could the individual possibly be subject to personal liability. All of the credit 
purchases by 1 Cache, L.L.C. were made while this agreement was in force through March 
of 2001 and all debt sought by DBL falls under this agreement. 
Gary Bracken operated a valid corporation as a corporate officer and shareholder and 
he is not personally liable for the debts of the corporation as stated in U.C.A. § 16-10a-622 
(1994 as amended) which clearly states that a shareholder is not personally liable for the acts 
or debts of a corporation. Likewise, officers of a corporation are not liable particularly where 
the articles of incorporation limit their liability, see § 16-10a- 841 U.C.A. (1994 as amended). 
18 
POINTII 
ALL SUBSEQUENT CREDIT APPLICATIONS ENTERED INTO 
WITH 1 CACHE, L.L.C. CLEARLY STATED 1 CACHE, L.L.C. AS 
THE CUSTOMER AND WERE SIGNED IN A REPRESENTATIVE 
CAPACITY. THE SUBSEQUENT DOCUMENTS REPLACED THE 
JANUARY 1999 DOCUMENT, BUT IT DOESN'T MATTER SINCE 
THERE IS NO PERSONAL LIABILITY ANYWAY. 
Generally, one contract will not merge into another unless plainly shown that such was 
the intent of the parties; such is usually the case where the last contract fully covers the 
earlier one and the two contracts are between the same parties. See Foote v. Taylor 635 P.2d 
46 (Utah 1981). Further, whether a written agreement is an integrated agreement and 
supercedes a prior written agreement depends upon the intent of the parties. Ringwood v. 
Foreign Auto Works, Inc. 671 P.2d 182 (Utah 1983). 
There is no question that the March 22,2001 credit application agreement as Exhibit 
2 covered similar terms to the first agreement. It is between the same parties, and updates 
records to supercede the prior agreement. The second agreement was signed solely by 1 
Cache, L.L.C. and was not signed by any individuals. The intent is clear that only 1 Cache, 
L.L.C. is the party obligated under the credit agreement in Exhibit 2 so it doesn't matter 
anyway. 
The next credit application agreement signed by Gary Bracken on April 24, 2001 
(Exhibit 3) along with the one signed by Aaron Bracken in blank form in July 18, 2001 
(Exhibit 4) are identical contracts meant to replace Exhibit 1 and 2 and are between the same 
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parties. They supercede the prior written contracts and the trial court so hinted. See hearing 
transcript page 11 line 2-5 (Court thought Exhibit B replaced Exhibit A). Those two 
contracts were signed by Gary and Aaron Bracken as officers of the corporation of 1 Cache, 
L.L.C. in their representative capacity only. Utah law is clear that when a corporate officer 
signs in a representative capacity as stated in section 70A-3-402(2) then the representative 
is not liable and only the corporation represented is liable for the debt. 
POINT III 
THERE ARE SEVERAL CASES IN UTAH DISCUSSING PERSONAL 
LIABILITY ON A CORPORATE INSTRUMENT AND THE LAW IS 
CLEAR THAT WHEN A PERSON SIGNS IN A REPRESENTATIVE 
CAPACITY AS EITHER AN OFFICER OR OTHER TITLE OF THE 
CORPORATION AND THE CORPORATION IS NAMED ON THE 
INSTRUMENT THAT THEY ARE NOT PERSONALLY LIABLE. 
In Starlev v. Deseret Foods Corp.. 74 P.2d 1221 (Utah 1938) the court found the 
defendant liable on the note since he failed to sign as the "secretary" of the corporation. In 
Sterling Press v. Petite. 580 P.2d 599, 600 (Utah 1978) the court reaffirmed its conviction 
that: 
"where the instrument (a check) neither names the entity represented nor 
shows the representative signed in a representative capacity, the person who 
signed is personally obligated." 
However, in this case, Gary and Aaron Bracken named 1 Cache, L.L.C. as the entity 
and signed in representative fashion. They cannot be personally liable. See U.C.A. § 70A-3-
402(2). 
20 
In Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060, 1061 (Utah 1981), the court again 
stated that the intent of the parties is to be ascertained from the content of the instrument 
itself, the rational for the rule being to preserve the sanctity of written instruments. The 
instrument in Tanner was clear on its face and the court found the defendant cosigner 
personally liable on the note without resort to extrinsic evidence because he clearly appeared 
to sign the document in an individual capacity. InBushnell Real Estate, Inc. v. Nielson, 672 
P.2d 746 (Utah 1983) the Utah Supreme Court held the defendants liable on a note pursuant 
to Section 70A-3-403 Utah Code Annotated, because they signed in their individual capacity. 
The general rule in Utah is: "When a person signs an instrument without indicating that he 
is doing so in a representative capacity, he becomes personally liable thereon." Myers v. 
Morgan, 626 P.2d 410, 411 (Utah 1981) footnote 3 and all references cited therein. 
When a person shows representative capacity on the instrument he is not liable. In 
Howells, Inc. v. Nelson, 565 P.2d 1147 (Utah 1977) at page 1149 the court stated: 
"In regard to Plaintiff s argument that personal liability should have been fixed 
upon defendant William Nelson, it is to be had in mind that it was the plaintiffs 
burden to so prove. It is significant that the account in question was carried 
on plaintiffs books in the name of "William Lord Associates"; and that 
according to plaintiffs own contention the check was drawn on an account so 
entitled. It is also to be noted particularly that this check did not purport to 
indicate that William Nelson was signing for a corporation; and that the debt 
being negotiated about was not one that was "incurred or arising from that 
transaction, but related to a prior existing debt". To be considered in 
connection with the foregoing is the fact that as a general rule, where it 
appears from the check that a party signs in a representative capacity, he does 
not become personally liable. We do not see the evidence here as compelling 
a finding in plaintiffs favor on that issue." 
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(The check was signed by William Nelson, did not clearly show a representative capacity, 
but the check itself was entitled "William Lord Associates" and was made for payment on 
"William Lord Associates" account so representative capacity was assumed.) See generally 
MacKay v. Lav, 470 P.2d 614 (Colorado App. 1970) at page 615 where the promissory note 
was made with a corporation and signed as follows: "The Akron Gas and Electric Company, 
signed R.A. Shook, President, signed H. C. Black, Secretary." In the body of the note above 
the signatures there was language that stated, "I, we, and each of us promise to pay". The 
court stated that these words do not impart personal liability unto the maker and that it was 
clear that the signatures on the note were intended to bind merely the corporation. 
- . • • • i 
The overwhelming weight of authority and the general rule is that a corporate officer 
or shareholder is not personally liable on instruments of the corporation unless the officer or 
shareholder signs in his own individual capacity and fails to indicate his representative 
capacity. Gary Bracken and Aaron Bracken in this case always signed in their representative 
capacity as president or vice president of 1 Cache, L.L.C, and made it very clear they were 
signing as corporate officers and shareholders for 1 Cache, L.L.C. who was liable under the 
credit applications. 1 Cache, L.L.C. was boldly listed as the customer on all of the credit 
applications and DBL's account was only with 1 Cache, L.L.C. 
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POINT IV 
GARY BRACKEN AND AARON BRACKEN ARE ENTITLED TO ALL 
OF THEIR ATTORNEY FEES FOR DEFENDING AGAINST THIS 
FRIVOLOUS LAWSUIT AND APPEAL. 
The credit applications {Exhibits 7, 2, 3 and 4) specifically provide for an award of 
attorney fees, costs and expenses for having to deal with any collection actions: "If suit or 
an action by an attorney is instituted, we promise to pay reasonable attorney fees in said suit 
or action." Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-56.5 states: 
"A court may award costs and attorney fees to either party that prevails in a 
civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other writing 
executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the promissory note, 
written contract, or other writing allow at least one party to recover attorney 
fees." 
Likewise, U.C.A. § 78-27-56 allows the court to award attorney fees to a prevailing party if 
the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit and not 
brought or asserted in good faith. 
The Plaintiff in this case has not cited one case to support his position or met the 
burden of proof required to show that Gary Bracken or Aaron signed in an individual 
capacity. Plaintiff brought this action against Gary Bracken and Aaron Bracken after the 
bankruptcy trustee and court informed them that the corporate shield of 1 Cache, L.L.C. 
protected them from liability. The Plaintiff has failed to show any ability to pierce the 
corporate veil and wrongfully included 1 Cache, L.L.C. as a defendant in this civil action 
after the bankruptcy proceeding. The contracts are credit applications, not personal 
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guarantees. All signatures by the Brackens were in a representative capacity. Plaintiffs 
entire case is without merit. The appeal was a further attempt to harass Defendants and this 
court should award Defendants all of their costs and attorney fees necessitated to defend 
against this wrongful action. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should appropriately find that the credit applications are just that: "credit 
applications with 1 Cache, L.L.C." They are not personal guarantees. This court should 
further find that the credit applications clearly show that they were signed by representatives 
of 1 Cache, L.L.C. in their representative capacity and there is no ambiguity in the signatures. 
As such, there is no personal liability by the individuals and Plaintiff has brought a wrongful 
suit against the individuals. Defendants should be awarded all of their costs and attorney fees 
to defend against this frivolous and bad faith action. The contract provisions allow for 
reciprocal right of attorney fees to the Defendants as the prevailing party. This Court should 
uphold and affirm the trial court's summary judgment to Defendants and grant or remand for 
Defendant's attorney fees. 
DATED this A ^ day of October, 2005. 
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C. 
^^/w/7 
Marlir/J. Grant ( _ ^ / 
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W tMo A<r—w%onf on4 farth*- •OVM* to no \m** r*o*<to>f v*n«M TN# (• >n««n«irf W ^ i N U i o«4t«fauik)f fytiwiWo uno* o8o« »>ot bo » ^ t ^ ^ **«*<,t ** 
wHiun no ^oo y QfO^oV. 
HPM NAMfE: i 6*&/S,UC-
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EXHIBIT 4 
Sint by:'FINANCE rAX 480483d. J ; 
J^^^JLJLJLJLPJL x m r 
0 7 / . . / a o o i 1 2 : 4 S P M ; f M 8 j p a g e ^ 
A
«<«i««ty a r « « u t l * 
7575 E. R«dfi«ld Rd (#119) • Scotttdato, AZ 85260 • (480) 598-8636 • (480) 483-8449 
Q NEW O I M>OATE APPLYING FORI O.NCT TEAMS O COO/COUPANY CHECK CURRENT Oft*. ACCT #:_ 
Firm Nama: . 
Straat Add ra i t : _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
Ctty/Stata/Zlfi: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
Mattng Add. W dfffartnt from abova): 
Phorta #: 
E-mail Addict: 
F«x#: Data Ett-faffahad: 
_ Afimi-5 $ataa Vokima: 
Prtnoipaf'ft Homa Add: 
Crty/Stata/ZIp: 
Ptaaaa Chaofc O p . | 
OCorp OPropciatoraWp OPartnaftWp 
FuW Namt of . M Proprietor*, 
Partnart or CKftoara; Social Saourky #; 
&aiaa Tax # : 
Typa of Bualrtaat; 
Bank Nama: 
Contact: 
m (ptaaaa attach r e « k cantflcata) 
FadaraJ 10 * : 
Account #: ^ 






Account # (Account number* & fax number* ara vary important) 
Pti & Fax #: _ _ 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ Ph ti Fax #: 
Ph * Fax #: 
Pfr * Fa* #: _ _ _ _ _ 
Cradtt Um«t Diialrad: 
A/P Manaaar: 
A/P Pfiona #: 
(Par Month) Purchaaa Ordar RaquCtad? O Yaa O No 
By* O V o t c t O F a * Othar . 
A/P Fax #: 
W» tofrin m*fc« toptaictioo <© DSC Oif TRfaUTWO. *YC. #*# CO&/<iifyi»i +two* tppfovatf aMtf/or for twvdjft tvmw end/vc t» upatt* *rUl f»«*»#Wm *ur «xte*w| 
•aooum MKI * * } « * • « wtai ft*L DttTfttaunNa. INC. Appftcam «t4f»r «««m * * * * * * ptovM* Oat WSTfaaUtmo, INC. with A curf*M fWwnoW m w m i r t I 
r»QU«««i«% K ct*d* »r COP/w*p«ny olwik awfmw* I* ««***« , «« promfct I t pay *f bfl* w to* t»nrfif«\ to tf* wvm p«ym»w« I* **« n»d# MHJ * » • MO*MTH * 
r»##n»4 for tofttfrdo*. r # w i p « y c*»t of c**JOtJ*n «<*** t* • wrfnlmtflw *f twcmy.fv* p*r**«H •* • * p*<**lp»J •mouAC At*o, w* wr^«r*i*fid ldl*f*ff *n *rrr w « * 
ti«-n«» wit l « «h*rf«0 *c ih* h%fM*t r«*j •vttHrftr^d by taw. K »uti «r *n «** * * *y *n *t«*m*r •• towUrttd, w* »fami<» to prr najnnttMt ttT9m*y t**« W> **M *ut 
*r •oHo«i< It If *e*cHk;tfty uMbjitf^otf tfHrt •« MMnf, •ccoum* t**»K'tO»>t *»tf o^tfl * « « * * * « •** F W H I H mfottaH l«M^oti*rt*f* In aarttotoif. M*rtd0a< C*vr>cy 
AfhPAf« 0+ft-wqtnOy. <t I* u n d r t * * a kt\ fh4 *«*^< #f M ^ «r Mrti*«, MI*>« •9U*1 t»fct pfeM In 4«*0*o*i«« Mirw««« Co^ory, Arton*. CM*«*m*^ ui>^*#*t*M* *^V • " 
w««virtf <**4r |4«^1 t* Mta*t* ouuld* «4 MM4««#* Co*Y>fyr AHcam. Appioit* fiv* th%<r p*nnb*Aoo to DBl CMaTfoSOTINa^ INC. *nd/of It* tftnts to v*fffr •o^a' 
•W0p»«m*flt I># bfam>*ll«M «t«t*d h^«*<. TTK« w 4 < i ¥ » M »p^<> * • ^«>«^Wv * > * « * * * » • f»«yn*MH •# ail M«m» * w » 4 pvrwwfrt t« «»*• A#T»<ww»c mat 4u***< •&+** 
to kt WfflN t<#t4wtNr«e vtnui, TNW te lrTt»*4ttf ro b# *t«« I* • **nit*Mlo0 §u*r«M*k« and •*»•# n«t b* r#vo4«d ••owrt try mtki+n n*vo* <o «r^K*r, 
DATE: FIRM NAMF: 
TfTUE: ^L Y^:/^ 
EXHIBIT 5 
PERSONAL GUARANTY 
NOTICE; BY EXECUTING THIS GUARANTY YOU BECOME LIABLE FOR THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE 
DEBTOR NAMED BELOW. 
Inconsi deration of tfee ^tension of credit by Survivor Industries. Inc. and/or subsidiaries ("Creditor**), to 
yfTfrtff^ifs M<^ u)fcVrn^Affifff (Debtor"), the undersigned hereby unconditionally guarantees payment of all 
amounts Debtor shall at any time owe to Creditor on the account of goods sold and delivered to Debtor whether such 
indebtedness is in the form of notes, bills, open account or otherwise. This guaranty shall continue notwithstanding any 
change in the form of such indebtedness or renewals or extensions granted by Creditor without the necessity of obtaining 
any consent of the undersigned thereto, until expressly revoked by written notice from the undersigned. Any such 
revocation shall not in any manner affect the liability of the undersigned sis to indebtedness contracted by Debtor prior 
thereto, This guaranty extends to and includes any and all interest due or to become together with all attorney's fees3 costs 
and expenses incurred by Creditor in connection with any matter covered by this guaranty. 
The undersigned hereby waives notice of acceptance of this guaranty by Creditor and notice of defouk or of non-payment, 
No delay by Creditor in exercising any right hereunder or taking any action to collect or enforce payment of any 
obligation hereby guaranteed, either as against Debtor or any other person otherwise liable, shall operate as a waiver of 
any such right or in any manner prejudice the rights of Creditor against the undersigned. The undersigned hereby agrees 
that in the event of any defeult be Debtor, Creditor shall be entitled to proceed against the undersigned immediately for 
such payment without prior demand or notice. The undersigned further agrees to pay a reasonable attorneys' fees and all 
other costs and expenses incurred by the Creditor in the enforcement of this guaranty, In the case of multiple guarantors 
hereunder, all liability of each such guarantor should be joint and several 
The undersigned agrees to unconditionally guarantee payment of all sums owed pursuant to this Agreement aad further 
agrees to its terms regarding venue. This is intended to be and is continuing guaranty gikl shall not be revoked except by 




Name printed or typed 
(Personal Guarantor) 
BY; 
Name printed or typed 
SIGNATURE WITNESS 
I HEREBY CERTIFY, 
That 1 hold valid Seller's Permit No 
Use Tax Law; that! am engaged in th^ business of selling. 
£#Si*? issued pursuant to the Sales and 
:hat the tangible personal ^ 
property described herein which I shall purchase from; guryiyor Industries, inc.. will be resold by me in the form of 
tangible personal property, PROVIDED, however, that in the went of any of such property is issued for the purpose other 
than retention, demonstration, or display while holding it for sale in the regular course of business, rt is understood that I 
am required by the Sales and Use Tax Law to report and pay the tax, measured by the purchase price of such property-. 
Description of property to.be purchased: ^ o f o i ^ ^ c j ^ r ? . _ — _ _ • — , 
Dated: AjftikA I 20 01^ Purchaser signature: 
i^-^n^^.s. 
EXHIBIT 6 
70A-3-402. Signature by representative. 
(1) If a person acting, or purporting to act, as a representative signs an instrument by signing either 
the name of the represented person or the name of the signer, the represented person is bound by the 
signature to the same extent the represented person would be bound if the signature were on a simple 
contract. If the represented person is bound, the signature of the representative is the "authorized 
signature of the represented person" and the represented person is liable on the instrument, whether or 
not identified in the instrument. 
(2) If a representative signs the name of the representative to an instrument and the signature is an 
authorized signature of the represented person, the following rules apply: 
(a) If the form of the signature shows unambiguously that the signature is made on behalf of the 
represented person who is identified in the instrument, the representative is not liable on the instrument. 
(b) Subject to Subsection (3), if the form of the signature does not show unambiguously that the 
signature is made in a representative capacity or the represented person is not identified in the 
instrument, the representative is liable on the instrument to a holder in due course that took the 
instrument without notice that the representative was not intended to be liable on the instrument. With 
respect to any other person, the representative is liable on the instrument unless the representative proves 
that the original parties did not intend the representative to be liable on the instrument. 
(3) If a representative signs the name of the representative as drawer of a check without indication of 
the representative status and the check is payable from an account of the represented person who is 
identified on the check, the signer is not liable on the check if the signature is an authorized signature of 
the represented person. 
Repealed and Re-enacted by Chapter 237, 1993 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 7QA04041.ZIP 2,303 Bytes 
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78-27-56. Attorney's fees — Award where action or defense in bad faith - Exceptions. 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court 
determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good 
faith, except under Subsection (2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a party under Subsection 
(1), but only if the court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action before the court; or 
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees under the provisions of Subsection 
(i). 
Amended by Chapter 92, 1988 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 78__23046.ZIP 1,943 Bytes 
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78-27-56.5. Attorney's fees - Reciprocal rights to recover attorney's fees. 
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party that prevails in a civil action based upon 
any promissory note, written contract, or other writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the 
provisions of the promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one party to recover 
attorney's fees. 
Enacted by Chapter 79, 1986 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 78_23047.ZIP 1,727 Bytes 
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16-10a-622. Liability of shareholders. 
(1) A purchaser from a corporation of shares issued by the corporation is not liable to the corporation 
or its creditors with respect to the shares except to pay or provide the consideration for which the 
issuance of the shares was authorized under Section 16-10a-621 or specified in the subscription 
agreement under Section 16-10a-620. 
(2) Unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation, a shareholder or subscriber for shares 
of a corporation is not personally liable for the acts or debts of the corporation solely by reason of the 
ownership of the corporation's shares. 
Enacted by Chapter 277, 1992 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 16_04038.ZIP 1,934 Bytes 
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16-10a-841. Limitation of liability of directors. 
(1) Without limiting the generality of Subsection 16-10a-840(4), if so provided in the articles of 
incorporation or in the bylaws or a resolution to the extent permitted in Subsection (3), a corporation 
may eliminate or limit the liability of a director to the corporation or to its shareholders for monetary 
damages for any action taken or any failure to take any action as a director, except liability for: 
(a) the amount of a financial benefit received by a director to which he is not entitled; 
(b) an intentional infliction of harm on the corporation or the shareholders; 
(c) a violation of Section 16-10a-842; or 
(d) an intentional violation of criminal law. 
(2) No provision authorized under this section may eliminate or limit the liability of a director for any 
act or omission occurring prior to the date when the provision becomes effective. 
(3) Any provision authorized under this section to be included in the articles of incorporation may 
also be adopted in the bylaws or by resolution, but only if the provision is approved by the same 
percentage of shareholders of each voting group as would be required to approve an amendment to the 
articles of incorporation including the provision. 
(4) Any foreign corporation authorized to transact business in this state, including any federally 
chartered depository institution authorized under federal law to transact business in this state, may adopt 
any provision authorized under this section. 
(5) With respect to a corporation that is a depository institution regulated by the Department of 
Financial Institutions or by an agency of the federal government, any provision authorized under this 
section may include the elimination or limitation of the personal liability of a director or officer to the 
corporation's members or depositors. 
Amended by Chapter 200, 1994 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 16_04092.ZIP 2,555 Bytes 
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EXHIBIT 9 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No: 040101608 MI 
This matter is before the Court upon a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the 
Plaintiff and a Motion to Dismiss filed by the Defendants. With respect to the latter, there is an 
issue relative to 1 CACHE, L.L.C., a Utah Limited Liability Company, which has been 
discharged in bankruptcy. The Motion to Dismiss asks not only the action be dismissed against 1 
CACHE, L.L.C., because of the bankruptcy stay, but also for attorney's fees and costs incurred in 
defending this action since the automatic stay should have prevented the action being filed 
against said entity. 
The balance of the Motion to Dismiss filed by the Defendant is based upon the language 
of the documents attached to the pleadings described as credit application agreements. There are 
two which are germane to this action; one, prepared in April, 2001, and a previous like document 
prepared in January, 1999. The operative language in those documents reflect the application for 
credit is being made by 1 CACHE L.L.C. and no other persons. In the 1999 document, the 
language which is salient to this motion is that "The undersigned agrees to unconditionally 
guarantee payment of all sums owed pursuant to this Agreement and further agrees to its terms 
regarding venue. This is intended to be and is a continuing guarantee and shall not be revoked 




1 CACHE, L.L.C, a Utah Limited Liability * 





except by written notice to creditor." 
In the 2001 credit application, the language has been changed to read "The undrsigned 
agrees to personally guarantee payment of all sums owed pursuant to this Agreement and further 
agrees to the terms regarding venue. This is intended to be and is a continuing guarantee and 
shall not be revoked except by written notice to creditor." The major change is the word 
"personally" guarantee. Again in the 2001 application, the entity seeking credit in the application 
is 1 CACHE, L.L.C.. with Gary Bracken, Aaron Bracken and Richard Bracken named as 
proprietors, partners or officers. It should be noted first the that applications are documents of the 
Plaintiff, created by the Plaintiff and filled out apparently by the Defendants or at least signed by 
the Defendants. 
The curious thing about the language is that there is no distinction in the language 
between customer information, credit application and personal guarantee. In other words, the 
personal guarantee, at least in the 2001 document, does not reflect a personal guarantee of 
someone else's obligation. It appears to be a personal obligation by 1 CACHE L.L.C. of the 
credit extended to it which is a result of the agreement. There is no signature line for the parties 
except that at the bottom of the page and not inside the "guarantee box." The focus language is 
part of the language found within a box referencing the parties to the agreement, evidenced by 
the beginning language " . . . we herein make application to DBL Distributing, Inc.,. ." There is 
not separate language from that above quoted referencing other parties such as third party 
guarentees. 
The Plaintiff would have the Court hold that the guarantee in the 1999 as well as the 2001 
documents exposed the signer thereof to guarantee the payment of any credit extended as a result 
of the agreement. But as to the 1999 document there is no question that the customer there was 1 
CACHE L.L.C, and it was not the Defendant Gary Bracken or any other individual. There is 
little question from reading the document that the signature thereon was on behalf of 1 CACHE 
L.L.C. and there is no personal guarantee, only guaranteed by the customer. 
With respect to the 2001 document, two of which exists, one dated 3/22/2001 and one 
dated 4/24/2001, the former unsigned by an individual and the latter being signed by Defendant 
Gary Bracken but as president in a representative capacity. Again the credit application is by 1 
CACHE L.L.C. The personal guarantee language there, it could be argued that it is more 
operative against a signatory in addition to the customer, but in this case there is an exception 
made by the signor as president in his representative capacity. The second page thereof is a blank 
document signed by one Aaron Bracken, vice-president. The Plaintiff cites no law in its favor 
relative to the construction of these two documents but the Court notes the law cited by the 
Defendant as well as generally accepted construction principles would consider that the 
documents were created by the Plaintiff, the language thereof is the Plaintiffs language, the 
customer is 1 CACHE L.L.C, there is no provision for liability on behalf of anyone else and the 
signatories were in their representative capacities on behalf of 1 CACHE L.L.C. which 
guaranteed payment. 
The Court is satisfied that the language within the four corners of the contract, [excluding 
parole evidence as there is not an ambiguity created and if there was, it was created by the 
Plaintiff] should be construed against Plaintiff. The Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is 
denied and the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is granted. 
With respect to the claim by the Defendants of costs and attorney's fees incurred on 
behalf of the discharged debtor, if such a claimfexists, they must be brought by either the 
bankruptcy trustee on behalf of the bankruptcy estate or the Court must be shown in fact that 
right on obligation to defend that action is in the Defendants. Otherwise there was no obligation 
to defend that action since there is already a bankruptcy and therefore no award of attorney's fees 
and costs will be granted. Counsel for the Defendant is directed to prepare a formal order in 
conformance herewith.
 J^ M 
ry?**^ ^* BY THE COURT 
Dated this / day of D 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 040101608 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail GREGORY M. CONSTANTINO 
ATTORNEY PLA 
68 SOUTH MAIN STREET #800 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101 
Mail MARLIN J GRANT 
ATTORNEY DEF 
88 WEST CENTER 
P.O. BOX 525 
LOGAN UT 84321-0525 
Dated this /(/ day of 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 
DBL DISTRIBUTING, Inc., a Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 












Case No: 040101608 MI 
On the 7th day of January, 2005, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision regarding 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants Motion to Dismiss. The same were 
argued on the 13th day of December, 2004. The decision was memorialized in an Order entered 
on January 25, 2005. Apparently overlooked by the Court at that time was the pending Motion 
for Leave to File an Amended Complaint. 
Notice to Submit was filed on that Motion to Amend on the 4th of October, 2004. 
Whether that was addressed at the hearing on the 13th of December, 2004, whether it was made 
moot by the Court's above mentioned Order or whether the Plaintiff still wants it addressed is 
unknown to the Court. 
It was brought to the Court's attention by the clerk who found the Notice to Submit in the 
file as she prepared the record for appeal. Rather than address the motion at this time, the Court 
would only inquire as to whether, in light of the earlier above mentioned ruling and the pending 
appeal, the Plaintiff desires it to be resubmitted for consideration. The Court will await direction 
from Plaintiff s counsel therepn. 
Dated t h i ^ C % day of June, 2005. 
BY THE COURT 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
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